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GUARDIANSHIP LAWS: REFORM EFFORTS IN VIRGINIA
Harriette Haile Shivers*
During the decade following 1978, six statewide initiatives ad-
dressed the need for reform in the Virginia guardianship system.
In 1988, the General Assembly established a joint subcommittee to
evaluate the status of guardianship in the Commonwealth and to
make recommendations to enhance the existing program to ensure
the protection of citizens who entrust their lives and property to
the guardianship system. Additionally, prompted by the urgent
need for a public response to the shortage of available guardians,
the General Assembly directed the Department of Social Services
to examine the possibility of reserving public guardianship for use
only as a last resort. In January of 1990, the Department presented
the results of that study and proposals for an appropriate legisla-
tive response to the Governor and the General Assembly in Senate
Document Number Twenty-three, Public Guardianship: Program
Design Options for Virginia.1 However, the 1990 Session of the
General Assembly took no action on the proposals.
This article examines the guardianship system as it exists in Vir-
ginia, and throughout the nation, and will focus on gaps where the
present laws do not adequately address the particular needs of the
situation. The serious effects of these gaps on persons subjected to
guardianship inspired a strong movement to reform guardianship
laws. This article, therefore, also addresses the general issues of
reform proposals, including both procedural and substantive due
process concerns. Finally, the article analyzes the reform 'move-
ment in Virginia by considering the recommendations of the Joint
Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardianship and the recommenda-
tions of the National Guardianship Symposium. Virginia's statutes
* Associate, Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Edwards, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia; J.D., 1990,
Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., 1966, David Lipscomb University. The
text of this article was initially presented as a research paper for the Bioethics Seminar
taught by Assistant Professor Ann MacLean Massie at Washington and Lee University
School of Law. The author is indebted to Professor Massie for her invaluable guidance and
encouragement in preparing the article for publication, and to Special Justice John T.
Molumphee III for suggesting Guardianship Reform as a subject worthy of in-depth study.
1. See PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP: PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS FOR VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 23
(1990) [hereinafter PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS].
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pertaining to appointment of a guardian are evaluated with respect
to these recommendations, and deficiencies in the present system
are identified. The last portion of the article explains the status of
pending efforts to provide some type of public guardian system in
Virginia. Finally, the conclusion recommends clarification of the
role of a guardian ad litem in a guardianship proceeding, and pro-
poses a model for establishing a program of public guardianship in
the Commonwealth.
I. INTRODUCTION
John is a fifty-year-old man suffering from diabetes and depres-
sion who has been hospitalized with a fever and a foot ulcer. Previ-
ously, he lived on his own and independently managed his affairs
without difficulty. The hospital staff gave him appropriate medical
treatment, but his fever persists and his ulcer worsens. At times,
staff members notice that he appears confused. A psychiatrist de-
termines that although John is depressed and slow to respond to
questions, he is fully oriented and cognitively intact.
The law in general presumes that patients are competent, and
nothing in this situation would warrant a court assessment of
John's competency. However, John develops a deliriu'm. Soon af-
ter, his foot infection worsens, requiring an urgent surgical proce-
dure. The staff now seeks the psychiatrist's opinion whether the
patient is competent to consent to continuing diagnostic and treat-
ment procedures.2
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment gives an-
other example:
Robert is in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease. Even though he
experiences fewer and fewer moments of lucidity, he knows what ill-
ness he has and what will eventually happen to his mind and his
body. He talks about it with his wife and children, expressing his
horror at being kept alive beyond his ability to be aware of life. Rob-
ert also has a chronic kidney condition that worsens and finally
causes his hospitalization. An examination results in the medical
conclusion that Robert must be operated on in order to save his life
from imminent renal failure. Robert is told about the medical deci-
sion, but he refuses to give permission for the operation. The spe-




cialists, however, appeal to his wife and children for permission to
operate; they also refuse, stating that they feel Robert has made a
rational decision. . . . [The surgeons] ponder the consequences of
going ahead with the operation declaring Robert incompetent to
make the choice. Robert has executed a durable power of attorney,
naming his wife attorney-in-fact, but laws in his State of residence
are unclear as to whether attorneys-in-fact can make critical care
decisions.'
Until recently, the law required that medical professionals seek
the appointment of a guardian to avoid legal liability for treating
patients like John, who have a questionable ability to give in-
formed consent to medical treatment, or Robert, a patient simi-
larly situated who refused medical treatment altogether. Guardian-
ship is a legal relationship in which one individual, the guardian,
becomes a "substitute decisionmaker" for another, the ward.4
II. GUARDIANSHIP AS A MEANS OF SUBSTITUTE DECISIONMAKING
Because the substitute decisions made by guardians frequently
cover all legal decisions that arise in the ward's life, guardianship is
an extremely inclusive method of substitute decisionmaking.5 In
Virginia, guardianship proceedings require a court to find that the
proposed ward is incapacitated by impaired health, physical disa-
bility, mental illness or retardation.6 Then, acting under the state's
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LOSING A MILLION MINDS: CON-
FRONTING THE TRAGEDY OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS 169 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter LOSING A MILLION MINDS].
4. 39 Am. JuRL 2D Guardian and Ward § 1 (1968). For the purposes of this article, the
definition of guardianship will be restricted to the guardianship of incapacitated adults.
5. JOHN PARRY, Incompetency, Guardianship and Restoration, in THE MENTALLY DIS-
ABLED AND THE LAW 370 (1985).
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-128.1, 132 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990). A distinction must be made
between legal incompetency and legal incapacity under Virginia law. Incompetency refers to
the status of a person adjudicated under § 37.1-128.02 to be mentally incapable of caring for
his person or handling and managing his estate. Id. § 37.128.01. It includes incompetency
under Title 24.1, which governs the right to vote. Id. If an individual is adjudicated incom-
petent, a "committee" is appointed, and the incompetent person loses all legal rights. Both
practical and legal consequences flow from this distinction. An adjudication of incapacity
under § 37.1-128.1 or § 37.1-132 based on "mental" or "physical" condition requires ap-
pointment of a guardian. If the individual is adjudicated to be incapacitated, he keeps the
rights not specifically taken away in the court order. Kenneth C. Grigg, Guardianship and
the Elderly Ward, 38 VA. LAW., Nov. 1989, at 30-31. This article focuses on the role of the
guardian rather than the committee, although the committee is also a surrogate deci-
sionmaker for health care purposes and much of the discussion is equally relevant to a
committee.
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parens patriae power, the court will appoint a surrogate deci-
sionmaker for persons who meet these criteria.7
A guardianship proceeding begins when a petition is filed in the
state circuit court. The alleged incapacitated person must receive
notice of the hearing and of his or her right to be present. Addi-
tionally, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
the allegedly incompetent person, charging the costs and fees
against the proposed ward's estate. The court may also order a lo-
cal mental health authority or facility to perform a comprehensive
evaluation, again charging the expenses to the proposed ward's es-
tate as costs of the proceeding. In the alternative, the court may
consider other evidence of the abilities of the alleged incapacitated
person. The proposed ward retains the right to have a jury trial at
which incapacity must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence."
Through court involvement, guardianship ensures an incapaci-
tated person substantial legal protection, but it is costly and in-
creases the demand on the judicial system. Further, use of a guard-
ianship offers no guarantee that guardians will definitely make
decisions in the best interests of the incapacitated person or in ac-
cordance with the ward's wishes.9
III. CONCERNS REGARDING GUARDIANS AS SUBSTITUTE
DECISIONMAKERS
A. Increased Awareness
Persons subject to guardianship proceedings are "perhaps the
least visible of all minorities."10 As such, these persons need the
protection of our society as much as the poor, the mentally dis-
abled, or to some extent, the elderly." Surprisingly, however, other
7. John Regan, Protecting the Elderly: The New Paternalism, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1111,
1114 (1981).
8. See Grigg, supra note 6, at 31.
9. LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 178.
10. Professor John Regan, Address at Twelfth Annual Symposium on Mental Health and
the Law (March 1989) (transcript available from author). The Annual Symposium on
Mental Health and Law is sponsored by the University of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psy-
chiatry and Public Policy, the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation
and Substance Abuse Services, and the Office of the Attorney General. Professor Regan is
the Jack and Freda Dick Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law at Hofstra Law
School, in Hempstead, New York. He was also a member of the initial Commission on the




minority groups receive the benefit of protective legislation not of-
fered to persons subject to guardianship proceedings.12 Professor
John Regan of Hofstra Law School suggests that state legislatures
address the need for reform of guardianship laws to protect these
persons whose liberty is or may be restricted by the appointment
of a guardian.' 3 Society finds it extremely difficult, however, to
consider this group "victimized" by the current guardianship sys-
tem because benevolent instincts fuel the system and provide the
impetus for intervention.' 4 Perhaps because wards are perceived as
a small and uninfluential constituency, lawmakers and society have
continually failed to address their needs.
15
In recent years, federal and state legislators have begun to recog-
nize the need for reform in the area of guardianship law. Professor
Regan cites at least three reasons for the current trend toward re-
form: (a) the general aging of the population, particularly those liv-
ing in nursing homes, requires more frequent intervention deci-
sions; (b) the increased insight gained by experts into the nature of
aging and the nature of incapacity in the aging process; and (c) the
increased frequency of health care decisionmaking in acute care
settings, especially with regard to life-sustaining treatment, accen-
tuates the need for an organized system to allow for substitute
decisionmaking."'
B. The Affected Population
A forty-two year old man is four times more likely to become
disabled within a given year than he is to die.' 7 He bears a greater
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. "Social service providers are likely to feel that the focus on individual rights has led
to delay in treatment and protection. On the other hand, the critics of the use of guardian-
ship see it as . . . doing harm." See, e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt et al., A Descriptive Analysis
of Professional and Volunteer Programs for the Delivery of Public Guardianship Services,
8 PROBATE L.J. 125, 127 (1988).
15. Regan, supra note 10.
16. Id. Surrogate decisionmaking of health care decisions occurs in different settings.
These differences prompted reform efforts that initially may seem contradictory, but upon
closer examination can be justified. There is pressure for more court involvement in guardi-
anship proceedings to insure protection of the due process rights of the affected party. At
the same time, there is a call for less court involvement (and consequently, fewer guardian-
ships) in decisions to terminate life sustaining treatment, even for persons who are no longer
capable of authorizing the decision personally. Id.
17. J. RODNEY JOHNSON, SEMINAR SPEECH ON THE USE OF DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY IN
ESTATE PLANNING, reprinted in Committee To Study Guardianship in the Rqanoke Valley,
in SPEAKER'S SOURCEBOOK at 1 (1988).
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than sixty percent chance of suffering a disability of at least a
ninety day duration before reaching the age of sixty-five.18 Any
competent lawyer would advise the forty-two-year-old man to de-
velop an estate plan, yet many would fail to recommend that he
execute a durable power of attorney. This could be used to identify
a substitute health care decisionmaker to act if he becomes inca-
pacitated and is unable to give informed consent for his own medi-
cal treatment.'9
Within forty-five years, almost one quarter of the population of
the country will be considered elderly. By the-year 2040, fifty per-
cent of all Americans will reach the age of eighty-five.20 The fed-
eral government's Administration on Developmental Disabilities
estimates that 3.9 million persons in the U.S. live with develop-
mental disabilities. 21 These numbers continue to increase as sur-
vival rates improve for infants born with disabling conditions.
State mental hospitals admit more than 340,000 persons in any
given year; a greater, though unknown, number of people suffering
from chronic mental illness live outside institutions, often in
boarding homes. 2 Most of these people need, or will soon need,
surrogate decisionmakers for their personal and financial affairs.
In addition, as we near the end of the century, experts predict
that the number of persons carrying the AIDS virus will rise dra-
matically beyond the estimated 1.5 millon currently infected. 23
Many AIDS patients experience significant mental impairments,
especially in the later stages of the disease. Accordingly, they will
need temporary and indefinite surrogate decisionmaking alterna-
tives.24 Thus, the roots of guardianship reform spring both from
the needs of elderly persons as well as the needs of younger, tem-
porarily disabled persons.
18. Id.
19. Many seriously ill-hospital patients are incapable of making health care decisions on
their own because of such factors as trauma, disease, pain, medication, or old age. Mark
Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985
(1984).
20. Mark Reisler, The Local Area Agency on Aging: A Vital Community Resource, 38 VA.
LAW., Nov. 1989, at 20.
21. ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled and Comm. on Legal Problems of the






C. The Guardianship Dilemma
The movement for reform of guardianship law received added
impetus by a 1987 Associated Press report involving fifty-seven re-
porters who reviewed 2200 probate court files from every state. 5
The report identified the following serious shortcomings in the
guardianship system: (1) insufficient attention to procedural due
process rights; (2) an unclear standard for determination of inca-
pacity; (3) guardians with no training who often institutionalize
their wards;2" (4) probate courts without the resources to monitor
the activities of guardians; and (5) a lack of public awareness of
the alternatives to guardianship. Following the publication of the
AP report, the U.S. House Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on
Health and Long Term Care, chaired by the late Congressman
Claude Pepper, reacted by initiating a series of hearings on the
crisis.2s
IV. A NEED FOR REFORM
A study conducted by the New York City Bar Association's
Committee on the Elderly in 1987-88 also documented the need for
urgent reform.2  The findings present a "sorry composite" of the
situation regarding guardianship in many jurisdictions of the coun-
25. D.W. Page, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System, ROANOKE TIMES AND WORLD
NEWS, Oct. 6, 1989, at B1, B2. In Virginia the Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardi-
anship in 1989 discussed the Associated Press survey of more than 200 guardianship files
opened between 1980 and 1987 in Virginia. The report disclosed that, "besides a court order,
the only document that was part of every file was a medical statement[,]" which is often
found to be inadequate by gerontologists and psychiatrists. Id.
26. A study in New York reported that guardianship serves primarily the interests of
third persons and institutions. Persons receiving enriched protective services, including
guardianship, bore "a higher rate of institutionalization and death than did the control
group whose members received referral agency services or no services." Schmidt et al., supra
note 14, at 129. For other disadvantages of guardianship, see also BRUCE VIGNERY, DECISION-
MAKING, INCAPACITY, AND THE ELDERLY 67 (1987); ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 3.
27. REPORT OF THE JOINT SuBcoMMITTEE STUDYING LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 23, 13 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE JOINT SuBcoMMIrrEE].
28. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at iii. Two pieces of federal legislation developed
following Congressman Pepper's hearings. The "National Guardianship Rights Act of 1989"
and the "Guardianship Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1988" each focused on the con-
cern for a lack of due process afforded persons subject to guardianship procdedings. See
H.R. 372, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989); H.R. 1702, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989); S. 235, 101st
Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
29. Julia C. Spring & Nancy N. Dubler, Conservatorship in New York State: Does It
Serve the Nepds of the Elderly? 45 REc. ASS'N. B. CITY N.Y. 288 (1990).
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try and serve as a backdrop for further discussion of guardianship
reform.30 The study considers due process issues which raise con-
cerns of violations of the individual constitutional rights of persons
subjected to guardianship proceedings. 1
Procedurally, the New York study noted the following significant
abuses: (1) average delays of three-and-one-half to ten months
before court hearings on guardianship or conservatorship; 2 (2) the
notice to the alleged incapacitated person is often a "formal" docu-
ment, which reveals little about what will happen to the person at
the hearing;"3 (3) in less than three percent of the cases is the al-
leged incapacitated person present in the courtroom - it is a pa-
per proceeding;34 (4) the presence of the allegedly incapacitated
person is often waived by the petitioner, not by the affected per-
son's counsel;35 and (5) there is no appointment of counsel to re-
present the alleged incapacitated person, the only lawyer is a
guardian ad litem who acts as an arm of the court in the potential
ward's best interest, but not as an advocate who would represent
the potential ward's individual interest.36
Substantive due process concerns presented in the New York
study proved equally distressing. According to the study, the crite-
ria used to determine incapacity and the need for guardianship in
New York, as in many other states, were a collection of cause and
effect analyses. 7 Statutory requirements dictate that the court
identify certain underlying diagnostic conditions, such as mental
illness, mental retardation, drug addition, or advanced age, which
result in an inability to manage one's affairs. s Another aspect of
the statutory criteria evaluates the capacity of the subject based on
whether he or she makes "responsible" decisions. This vague ter-
minology encourages courts to appoint a guardian for persons who
30. Regan, supra note 10.
31. See Spring & Dubler, supra note 29. "Conservator" is used interchangeably with
"guardian" in some jurisdictions. See LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 178.
32. Spring & Dubler, supra note 29, at 312.
33. Id. at 295-96.
34. Id. at 308.
35. Id. at 318.
36. Id. at 319.
37. For example, some jurisdictions focus on particular conditions or categorical impair-
ments, thus, a person of "advanced age" or with a "mental illness" could be found incapaci-
tated, almost without a showing of whether the condition resulted in an inability to function
in society or to care for self and property. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 15;
PARRY, supra note 5, at 371, 382; VIGNERY, supra note 26, at 73.
38. Advanced age is very suspect as a diagnostic criterion.
[Vol. 26:325
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make eccentric decisions that the particular judge determines to be
irresponsible."9
Typically, to show these substantive criteria have been met, the
petitioner submits the examining physician's -affidavit, alleges the
incapacitated person's medical condition and states the legal con-
clusion that the person is unable to manage his affairs. 40 This affi-
davit, rather than the physician, is presented in the courtroom,
thus prohibiting any opportunity to cross-examine the doctor, even
if counsel were available to do so.
According to Professor Regan, in fifty percent of the cases ex-
amined by the New York study the guardian ad litem reported to
the court that the alleged incapacitated person retained residual
capacity in some areas. The court, nonetheless, appointed a ple-
nary guardian with no preservation of self-determination for the
ward.41
A potential conflict of interest between the guardian and the
ward is common. For example, nursing homes have developed
guardianship as a "creditor's remedy" to secure payment for ser-
vices.42 New York, like most states, enforces only limited accounta-
39. See, e.g., In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981), where a thirty-nine-year-old mildly
retarded woman challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague the criterion of
"making or communicating responsible decisions concerning one's person." The court held
that a finding of incompetence "may be made only if the putative ward's decision-making
process is so impaired that he is unable to care for his personal safety or unable to attend
and provide for such necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, without which
physical injury or illness may occur." Id. at 1089.
40. See REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27 (documenting that the experi-
ence of courts in Virginia is similar).
41. Regan, supra note 10. In Virginia, the Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardian-
ship addressed this problem by recommending the use of a model form or court order simi-
lar to that found in the HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES AND CLERKS IN VIRGINIA. A standard form or
order would insure that the specificity required under the Virginia Code is met and that the
orders are not "merely a cursory statement." REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBcOMMI rEE, supra
note 27, at 5-6.
42. Regan, supra note 10. Similarly, prepaid or managed health care plans, where the
provider has a financial incentive to reduce the level of services, set the stage for abuse if a
guardianship can be obtained by the provider of the care. See George J. Annas, Legal As-
pects of Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECI-
SION MAKING 51 (Ronald E. Cranford and A. Edward Doudera eds., 1984). The author cites a
Massachusetts case involving a comatose woman who could be kept alive indefinitely on a
ventilator but her expensive care had the potential to literally "break the bank" of the pre-
paid medical care group each year she survived. The physicians believed that the respirator
should be removed. They also believed the patient would have wanted the respirator re-
moved, even though she had never indicated her wishes. Contrary to the situation of In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976), where the doctors had no
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bility of guardians. Courts rarely review a finding of incapacity.
Consequently, once the plenary guardianship is imposed on the
ward, he or she is virtually stripped of all private and individual
rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the ward faces the
prospect of remaining in that status for the duration of his or her
life.43
V. VALUES TO DEFINE PARAMETERS OF GUARDIANSHIP LAWS
Having identified the nature of the issues raised by the reform
movement, this article turns to a consideration of the values that
shape and define a system of guardianship law.
A. Paternalism
The philosophical justification and legal basis for guardianship
laws is found in the paternalistic doctrine of parens patriae. This
doctrine provides that the state may assume the role of protector
or "parent" when the government determines that an individual
needs the state's care and protection." Similarly, the state,
through exercise of its police power, may restrict the liberty of a
person who presents a danger to himself or others as a result of
incapacity. 45
B. Informed Consent
At common law, the actions of trespass and battery served to
protect a person's interest in the integrity of his body and allowed
freedom from unpermitted physical contact.46 From this tradition,
the Anglo-American legal system developed the doctrine of "in-
formed consent," based on the premise that a person has the right
to "knowingly" and "voluntarily" permit or refuse medical treat-
financial incentive to remove the patient from the respirator, the doctors in this case faced
loss of personal income and the bankruptcy of their program.
43. Regan, supra note 10.
44. PARRY, supra note 5, at 370; see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)
(classic example of historic parens patriae power when State undertakes to act as "general
guardian of all infants, idiots and lunatics" (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
47 (1803))).
45. Amie L. Bruggeman, Comment, Guardianship of Adults with Mental Retardation:
Toward a Presumption of Competence, 14 AKRON L. REV. 321, 329-30 (1980); see also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("state may con-
fine individuals solely to protect society from anti-social acts or communicable diseases").
46. Fowler, supra note 19, at 988.
[Vol. 26:325
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ment.4 The legal right to refuse treatment is part of the common
law right of self-determination, which in recent years has gained
additional judicial recognition as a right embodied in the constitu-
tional right to privacy.48 Consequently, any uncertainty regarding a
patient's mental competency brings into question his or her ability
to give "informed consent" for treatment. The doctrines of in-
formed consent and substitute decisionmaking may inconvenience
service providers involved in care of the patient or client. However,
informed consent and substituted decisionmaking comprise an in-
tegral part of one of society's most cherished values, individual au-
tonomy. In the context of medical decisionmaking, as in other en-
deavors, the law favors the free exercise of idiosyncratic behavior
over paternal involvement.49
C. Self-Determination and Personal Autonomy
The judicial determination that a person is incompetent or inca-
pacitated brings forth an exploration of such fundamental issues as
an individual's right of self-determination and the ability of a sur-
rogate to make decisions for another human being. Competence
and liberty weave together inextricably; competent individuals are
47. Annina M. Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Le-
gal Services Advocates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 451, 460 (1978).
48. The United States Supreme Court has tied the right to control over one's body to the
fundamental right to privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also George J. Annas and John E. Densberger,
Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy v. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REv.
561, 565-67 (1984). In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990), the U.S. Supreme Court found that an incompetent adult patient has a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest based on the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, including the refusal of artificially delivered food and water. The court
held that the right is not absolute and must be balanced against the state's interest at stake,
and that a state law requiring a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that the
patient had expressed his or her wishes regarding the medical treatment decision is permis-
sible. Id.
Several state courts have read the constitutionally protected right to privacy to include an
incompetent person's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12 (1980). However, when the Florida Supreme Court
decided In Re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990), it did not rely on Cruzan,
but instead found a right to privacy in its state constitution that governs an individual's
choices and includes the right to refuse medical treatment. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that a person who had never been competent had a right to refuse treatment,
through a substitute decisionmaker, based on common law. Superintendent of Belchertown
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977). ("[W]e recognize a general right in all
persons to refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances.").
49. PARRY, supra note 5, at 435, 461.
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at liberty to make their own medical treatment decisions and in-
competent persons are not.50 Two values dominate this area of dis-
cussion: respect for a person's well-being and respect for a person's
right of self-determination.5 1 The statutes governing incompetency
and surrogate decisionmaking allow courts to use a variety of ap-
proaches when determining competency or incapacity. A Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment report divides these vary-
ing standards into three types: (1) the causal link standard; (2) the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) standard; and (3) the therapeutic
approach.52
The causal link refers to a standard which diagnoses the condi-
tion (the cause) responsible for creating the socially improper be-
havior displayed by the ward.53 Although it no longer remains the
most popular standard, many courts still use the causal link stan-
dard. This standard does not provide guardianship hearings for in-
dividuals who are capable of caring for themselves and their prop-
erty but choose not to do so.4 When using this approach, courts
require a showing of "cause" before imposing guardianship.5
The Uniform Probate Code standard emphasizes the health,
well-being, and safety of the individual over his management of
property. With this standard, the critical factor is "the individual's
ability to make and communicate responsible decisions. ' 56 Some
states vary the UPC standard by requiring a finding that the po-
tential ward's incapacity endangers his health and safety.5"
The therapeutic approach, increasingly favored by gerontologists
and mental health professionals, defines a potential ward's inca-
pacity in legal rather than medical terms. This standard measures
the capacity of the individual by the functional limitations he ex-
50. Annas and Densberger, supra note 48, at 367-68.
51. See LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 171; In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840,
855, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
52. LosING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 171.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. One problem with the causal link standard is that a number of states require that
an individual be diagnosed as senile, physically disabled or as a spendthrift to be found
incompetent. See PARRY, supra note 5, at 373.
56. LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 171. For a discussion of a constitutional
challenge to the UPC approach, see Mitchell, supra note 47.
57. See LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 171.
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hibits and requires evidence of specific dysfunction before classify-
ing the subject as incapacitated."'
D. Protection of the Health Care Delivery System
The values discussed thus far focus on the patient and potential
ward. In addition, societal values impact the expectations placed
on the medical personnel who are involved when treatment deci-
sions are made. 9 A system of surrogate decisionmaking that strips
health care providers of their ability to protect life would jeopard-
ize the availability of health care treatment services for the entire
society. A medical profession which accepts assisting death as part
of its role may soon lose its soul. 0
Another consideration aimed at the needs of health care provid-
ers is the weighty legal and ethical burden they face when no pro-
vision is made for substitute decisionmaking for patients who can-
not give informed consent.6 1 Society shares this burden, as
evidenced by its willingness to provide court authorization for sub-
stituted decisionmaking.62
58. Id. For example, the Connecticut statute includes a person who is "incapable of caring
for one's self," requiring that the person must have "a mental, emotional or physical condi-
tidn resulting from mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced
age, chronic use of drugs or alcohol, or confinement. The condition must make the individ-
ual unable to provide for his or her own medical, nutritional, or clothing needs, . . . safe,
adequately heated and ventilated shelter [, and] . . .protection from abuse." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-644(c) (West. Supp. 1991). The inability must result in "endangerment to
such person's health." Furthermore, at the hearing the court receives evidence that "shall
contain specific information regarding the disability and the extent of its incapacitating ef-
fect." Id. § 45a-650(a) (West Supp. 1991). For a general overview of statutory approaches,
see generally PARRY, supra note 5, at 373.
59. See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETAICS 141
(1989); see also Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infir-
mities and Hidden Values in Law, 28 ARZ. L. REv. 373, 397-404 (1986).
60. Gilbert Meilarnder, The Confused, the Voiceless, the Perverse: Shall We Give Them
Food and Drink?, 2 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 133, 141 (1986) ("[A]nti-paternalism tends to over-
look those additional professional responsibilities above and beyond respect for liberty...
[S]imple respect for patient autonomy,. . . cannot capture the positive duties of caregivers
to serve the well-being of their patients ...." (quoting W. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT.
IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHICS 51-62 (1983))).
61. See Fowler, supra note 19, at 1004-05.
62. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435
(Mass. 1977) ("[S]uch questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of de-
tached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created.").
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E. Conflict of Interest
There are also values which determine the function of the surro-
gate decisionmaker. A person with a financial stake in the outcome
of the medical treatment faces competing interests, and therefore,
may be inappropriate as a guardian. Also, the alternative stan-
dards for surrogate decisionmaking, "substituted judgment" or the
"best interests" of the patient, are based on different values.
The substituted judgment standard allows the decisionmaker to
make the decision that the patient would have made if he or she
were capable. In order to apply this standard the decisionmaker
needs to know the patient's wishes regarding the specific treatment
at issue. At the very least the surrogate must have a sufficiently
close relationship with the patient so that he or she knows the val-
ues and beliefs that would govern the patient's decision.13 The sur-
rogate must also have at least as much medical information upon
which to base a decision as the patient would have. 4
The alternative standard is for the surrogate to make the deci-
sion in the "best interests" of the patient.6 " Historically, courts
often applied the best interests analysis in the absence of, or some-
times even in spite of, an express statement written by the patient
before becoming incapacitated. Now, consistent with an increased
recognition of the value of personal autonomy and the fundamen-
tal right to self-determination, advocates of the reform movement
prefer the substituted judgment criterion.6
63. For a discussion of whether or not those in a close family relationship can be pre-
sumed to be the best surrogate, see Fowler, supra note 19, at 1002-03 (noting that in some
instances, a strict rule giving the next-of-kin power to decide gives the power to a person
whose interests are directly adverse to the patient).
64. Charles Jarrett, Moral Reasoning and Legal Change: Observations on the Termina-
tion of Medical Treatment and the Development of Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 999, 1009 n.43
(1988) (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985)).
65. "The best interests test is essentially what others think would benefit or protect the
welfare of persons without decisional capacity. It purports not to consider the individual's
particular viewpoint at all." VIGNERY, supra note 26, at 116. But see Jarrett, supra note 64,
at 1010-11 (stating that the court in Conroy defines "best interests" to include consideration
of the prospective pain and pleasure of the patient with or without the treatment, without
regard for state's interest or patient's minor children or the tax burden of its citizens as a
group).
66. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 136
(1983). A recent Illinois Supreme Court decision upheld the application of the substituted
judgment standard for a public guardian acting as surrogate for the patient when it could be
established by clear and convincing evidence that the decision was in accord with the pa-
tient's interest, (even though there was a conflict between a guardian's decision that was to
[Vol. 26:325
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F. Role of the Attorney
The increased focus on self-determination is also reflected in the
changing attitudes about the role of the attorney in the guardian-
ship proceeding. In times past, the paternalistic approach allowed
for a guardian ad litem to decide arbitrarily what should happen
based on a best interest analysis. Today, experts urge that an inde-
pendent attorney whose only role is to represent the ward's wishes
be a part of the proceeding.
67
G. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative expresses the
high value society places on personal liberty. Guardianship re-
stricts rights such as the right to marry, the right to vote, the right
to convey and hold property, and the right to contract and be in-
volved in business.6 ' It also sharply curtails the ward's right to pri-
vacy. The powerlessness of wards as a class, coupled with the radi-
cal restrictions on fundamental liberties resulting from
guardianship, provide forceful reasons for courts to apply the
"least restrictive alternative. '6 9
The values enumerated above provide a framework for develop-
ment of a responsive and humanistic approach to guardianship.
VI. REFORM IN VIRGINIA
A. Introduction of Reform Efforts
The book Public Guardianship and the Elderly contains several
specific proposals for guardianship reform that illustrate the need
for increased protection of due process rights.7 0 This protection for
the proposed ward includes: "notice, presence at hearing, cross-ex-
amination, aggressive counsel, the right to [a] jury trial, the right
to appeal, the presumption of competency, and the imposition of
stringent standards of proof."17 ' The authors suggest that courts
be guided by the best interest of the ward). In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill.
1990).
67. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 10.
68. See Bruggeman, supra note 45.
69. Roger B. Sherman, Guardianship: Time for A Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
350, 371 (1980).
70. WINSOR C. SCHMIDT, ET AL., PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP AND THE ELDERLY 18 (1981).
71. Id.
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use functional assessments of incapacity, based upon behavioral
competencies, rather than diagnostic terms (i.e., the therapeutic
approach). They also recommend that courts order limited or par-
tial guardianships specifically related to the abilities and needs of
the individual. Further, the authors call for the creation of guard-
ianships of limited duration with mandated periodic review. Fi-
nally, the authors argue that anyone who has a business relation-
ship with the ward, such as a nursing home administrator, should
be prohibited from serving as guardian. 2
B. Reform Efforts in Virginia
In the years between 1978 and 1988, six statewide initiatives ad-
dressed the need for reform in the guardianship system and identi-
fied the following problems in the current guardianship process:
"(1) over-utilization of plenary/full guardianship; (2) inadequate
supply of persons available to serve as guardians - a problem es-
pecially acute for indigent adults; and (3) insufficient monitoring of
the activities of the guardian throughout the duration of the
guardianship. '7 3
The 1988 Session of the Virginia General Assembly established a
joint subcommittee to evaluate the status of Virginia's guardian-
ship system.74 Judge Kenneth Trabue, a member of the Joint Sub-
committee, summarized the results of the evaluation as follows: (a)
data is not available to accurately reflect the number of individuals
in Virginia who currently need guardianship services (estimates
ranged from 2000 to 7000 people); (b) statutes furnish very little
guidance regarding significant aspects of the guardianship system;
(c) courts provide very little supervision of appointed guardians,
except when the Commissioner of Accounts periodically reviews fi-
nancial matters; (d) use of the sheriff as the guardian of last resort
for persons without family or friends is highly unsatisfactory; and
(e) most citizens are unaware that alternatives to guardianships
72. Id. at 18-19.
73. PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 3. This is not an exhaustive list of
problems cited in the report.
74. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 3. The General Assembly di-
rected the Joint Subcommittee to recommend measures which would enhance the existing
guardianship system, ensuring protection of the citizens who entrust their lives and property
to the system. To accomplish its mission, the Joint Subcommittee reviewed applicable stat-




may serve many of the same purposes and are far less restrictive
and less expensive."5
The Joint Subcommittee recommended:
1. a statutory scheme prescribing the specific responsibilities of
guardians ad litem;
2. a system of judicial oversight, including:
J
a. standardized procedures for appointment of guardians;
b. forms for guardianship proceedings for all judges to use;
c. strengthened evidentiary standards;
d. increased accountability to the courts by the guardian;
e. a system for review of guardians through the court (including a
provision to reopen the proceeding if changes need to be made);
f. collection of data through the court clerks' offices to identify the
number of individuals presenting under guardianship in Virginia;
3. discontinuing the use of sheriffs as guardians of last resort;
4. training for Department of Human Services employees on
guardianship issues; and
5. public education efforts regarding alternatives to
guardianships. 76
Another area to which the Joint Subcommittee devoted signifi-
cant attention concerned the need for a public guardianship pro-
gram to provide for the guardianship needs of persons who have no
family or friends. In 1990, the Joint Subcommittee asked the De-
partment of Social Services Task Force on Guardianship to pre-
pare a report for the Governor and General Assembly with recom-
mendations for addressing this need in Virginia. The Joint
Subcommittee also considered ways to secure funding for court ap-
pointed guardians ad litem who continue to be involved with the
ward after an adjudication of incapacity and who regularly report
to the court regarding the ward's situation. Furthermore, the com-
mittee proposed the creation of an ombudsman position within the
court staff.77
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Amendments to the Virginia Code enacted by the 1989 Legisla-
ture addressed some of the primary concerns raised by the Joint
Subcommittee Report. One amendment removed "advanced age"
as a basis for a finding of incapacity.78 In proposing the 1989
amendment, the Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardianship
cited a 1986 survey by the ABA Commission on Legal Problems of
the Elderly which found a "tendency among judges in states where
old age is grounds for a finding of incompetence to view the terms
as similar." 1' The Subcommittee report further stated:
[c]ourts have often invoked only the criterion of "advanced age"
to determine the future of these persons, seemingly out of context
with the spirit of statutory provisions. To clarify this, advanced age
is a proper criterion for consideration if the advanced age results in
either mental or physical incapacity so that the ward cannot manage
his or her person or affairs. Medical personnel cite the fact that age
and function are not necessarily linked and that function should be
the only criterion used to determine guardianship.
Another 1989 reform measure provided that competency can be
restored upon an appeal of the order of guardianship, when any
party to the original proceeding petitions for reinstatement of the
case to the docket. 1 This may occur even if the time for appeals
has expired.2
Additionally, lawmakers created two surrogate health care deci-
sionmaking procedures that operate without the appointment of a
guardian. The non-judicial approach, embodied in section 37.1-
134.4 of the Code of Virginia ("the Code"),83 is reserved for non-
protesting persons in need of or receiving treatment by a licensed
physician. Rather than going to the court for a determination of
incapacity, a treating physician who doubts the patient's capacity
to give informed consent may refer the patient to a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist for a determination of capacity. Once the psy-
chiatrist or psychologist certifies that the patient is incapacitated,
the treating physician looks to a statutorily designated surrogate
decisionmaker, who is then required to act in accordance with the
78. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-132-134.2 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
79. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 9.
80. Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.3 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1991).
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religious beliefs or basic values of the person unable to make a
84decision. 8
The judicial approach, found in section 37.1-134.5 of the Code,85
allows anyone to seek authorization for medical treatment from a
general district court judge, juvenile and domestic relations district
court judge, special justice or circuit court judge for a person inca-
pable of giving consent. The treatment may be for either a mental
or physical disorder. Prior to authorizing treatment, the court
must address two key issues. First, the court must determine that
the treatment is in the best interests of the patient. Second, the
court must refuse to authorize treatment proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence to be contrary to the person's religious beliefs
or basic values, unless such treatment is necessary to prevent
death or serious irreversible condition.
8 6
Several issues, however, have yet to be addressed legislatively in
Virginia. These include the duties of the guardian ad litem in
guardianship proceedings; 87 a system of judicial review or oversight
of guardianships, including regular evaluations of the ward;88 and
the use of a model form of court order to detail all aspects of the
proposed ward's condition and to record the exhaustion of other
alternatives to a guardian, in accordance with the principle of "the
least restrictive alternative."8 19 This last recommendation incorpo-
rates the present statutory requirement that the order "be as de-
84. Id. The statute, as further amended by the 1991 Session, prescribes selection of a
surrogate from a prioritized list beginning with a person appointed under a durable power-
of-attorney, if the power includes health care decisionmaking. The next choice is a person
named by the patient under the Virginia Natural Death Act, if the patient's condition meets
statutory criteria, followed by a guardian or committee, then a spouse, an adult son or
daughter, a parent, an adult sibling, or finally, any other relative in descending order of
blood relationship. Id.
85. Id. § 37.1-134.5 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1991).
86. Id.
87. As a part of comprehensive reform in the guardianship process in Michigan, the du-
ties of the guardian ad litem were specifically enumerated. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.433(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
88. The Colorado legislature amended its guardianship process by including a role for
court visitors. The court visitor recommends to the court whether or when review of the
guardianship is necessary. COLo. REV. STAT. § 15-14-303 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
89. At least three states, Arizona, Michigan and Oklahoma, specify by statute the con-
tents of the guardian's report. Oklahoma includes report forms within the statute and re-
quires the guardian to file guardianship plans with the court. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 3-
120, 122 (West 1991); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5315(c) (1956 & Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.443(5) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-108 (West
1991); see Comm. on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Am. Bar Assoc., State Guardianship
Legislation: Directions of Reform, 10 (1989) [hereinafter State Guardianship Legislation].
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tailed as possible with regard to all aspects . . . and not merely a
cursory statement."" °
Although the 1990 General Assembly took no action toward a
program of public guardianship, a task force operating under the
aegis of the Virginia Department for the Aging was formed and
continues to pursue the reform effort."1
C. A Critique of Virginia's Guardianship Laws
The Joint Subcommittee and many other groups concerned with
guardianship reform relied heavily on the set of recommendations
produced by the American Bar Association's National Guardian-
ship Symposium ("Symposium"). 2 The group of experts who at-
tended the Symposium developed thirty-three recommendations
that were later adopted by the American Bar Association House of
Delegates as Association policy.
For example, the Symposium recommended the incorporation of
these minimum due process safeguards (Recommendation II-B)
into all state statutes and guardianship proceedings:
Right to Notice - A court officer dressed in plain clothes and
trained to communicate and interact with elderly and disabled per-
sons should serve the respondent personally and present the infor-
mation to the respondent in the mode of communication that the
90. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 37. According to the American
Bar Association's Commission on the Legal Problems of the Elderly, judges will be inclined
to grant a plenary guardianship unless statutes specify a preference for a limited guardian-
ship. State Guardianship Legislation, supra note 89, at 8-9. Therefore, revision of state law
in Utah includes the preference for a limited guardianship, requiring the court to make a
specific finding that nothing less than a full guardianship is adequate in those cases where
the appointment is not limited. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-304(2) (1975 & Supp. 1991).
91. The Task Force on Guardianship is currently developing legislative proposals that will
specify more clearly the Hearing and Notice Rights of potential wards. Telephone Interview
with Virginia Dize, Chairperson of the Task Force on Guardianship (Aug. 27, 1991). The
Task Force on Guardianship sponsored a bill before the 1992 Session of the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly which would amend the Virginia Committees and Trusts statute, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.1-128.02-128.1 and 37.1-132 (Repl. Vol. 1990). This amendment would give better
notification of proceedings to persons alleged to be incapacitated or incompetent, and their
families, and to clarify their rights at guardianship hearings. Also, the bill proposes a new
subsection which would specify the hearing rights of the proposed ward. S. Bill 149, H. Bill
407, 1992 Reg. Sess., - 1992 Va. Acts _.
92. The Symposium in July, 1988, jointly sponsored by the Commissions on the Mentally
Disabled and on Legal Problems of the Elderly of the American Bar Association, included
among the participants judges, attorneys, service providers, advocates for the elderly, gov-
ernmental officials and law professors. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at iv.
344
GUARDIANSHIP LAWS
respondent is most likely to understand. The written notice should
be in plain language and large type. It should indicate the time and
place of the hearing, the possible adverse consequences to the re-
spondent of the proceedings and list the rights to which the respon-
dent is entitled. A copy of the petition should be attached. Unless
the court orders otherwise, at least fourteen (14) days' notice should
be given before the hearing takes place.
Mandatory Right to Counsel - Counsel shall be appointed for each
respondent who does not have counsel, regardless of the respon-
dent's ability to pay. If a respondent wishes to waive counsel and
exercise the right of self-representation, the court shall ensure that
the waiver is knowing and voluntary and otherwise complies with
the laws of that jurisdiction.
Hearing Rights - The respondent shall receive a hearing before an
impartial decisionmaker in which he or she:
(a) is present at the hearing and all other stages of the proceedings;
(b) may compel the attendance of witnesses, present evidence and
confront and cross-examine all witnesses; (c) is entitled to a clear
and convincing standard of proof; and (d) may appeal any adverse
orders or judgments. 93
The Symposium recommendations agree substantially with the
findings of the New York study discussed earlier.94 In his com-
ments on the study, Professor Regan stressed the importance of
giving notice to the alleged incapacitated person in understandable
language. He also stated that the person is entitled to be present,
and that the doctor's evidence should be subject to cross-examina-
tion by the attorney representing the proposed ward.95
The Virginia statutes authorizing the appointment of a guardian
provide for "any person" to petition the circuit court which will
hold a "hearing" "after reasonable notice" to the alleged incapaci-
tated person of the hearing and of his "right to be present. 9 16 The
court, or jury "if one be requested," can determine, based on "clear
and convincing" evidence, that the person is incapacitated.97 A
guardian ad litem is then appointed to "represent the interest of
93. Id. at 9-10.
94. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-128.1, 132 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
97. Id.
19921
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the person.""8 The proposed ward "shall be present at the hearing"
if he or the guardian ad litem requests.99 Finally, the person has
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court if he or she is determined
to be wholly or partially incapacitated.100
The most notable difference between Virginia's procedure and
the reformation proposals appears in the issue of notice. In Vir-
ginia, notice may be very formalized, and in some instances can be
fairly perfunctory. The Symposium recommendation, on the other
hand, has far more stringent notice requirements. Under the Sym-
posium recommendation, if the individual cannot understand the
document, and consequently does not attend the hearing, the no-
tice could be considered defective and the proceedings may be void
or voidable. 1' 1 Where mental or physical incapacities are involved,
and in communities with a high number of adults who do not
speak English, the notifying officer should communicate the infor-
mation in a way the respondent will understand.
Virginia's statutes, like those in many other states, do not spec-
ify a waiting period between service of notice and the hearing.
Even if the respondent understands the legal documents and real-
izes that his or her liberty rights are at stake, the respondent may
not have sufficient time to acquire an attorney and adequately pre-
pare for the hearing.102
In Virginia, there is no mandatory right to appointed counsel to
represent the client's wishes. The statutes do require appointment
of a guardian ad litem. However, as illustrated by a subsequent
recommendation from the Symposium, the role of "zealous advo-




101. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 41 (1968 & Supp. 1982), cited with ap-
proval in PARRY, supra note 5, at 381. The National Conference of the Judiciary on Guardi-
anship Proceedings for the Elderly adopted an example of a model form for notice to the
respondent based on a Missouri statute. Commission on the Legal Problems of the Elderly,
ABA, STATEMENT OF RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL PRACTICES 5 (Erica Wood, ed., 1986) [hereinaf-
ter STATEMENT]. Legislative proposals before the 1992 General Assembly would require the
notice to be in plain language and large type as well as inform the proposed ward of the
place and the time of their hearing, their rights, and of appointment of a guardian ad litem.
See S. Bill 149, H. Bill 407, 1992 Reg. Sess.
102. PARRY, supra note 5, at 381. See S. Bill 149, H. Bill 407, 1992 Reg. Sess. regarding
legislative proposals before the 1992 Session of the Virginia General Assembly which would
amend §§ 137.1-128.02, -128.1, and -132 of the Code of Virginia to require a five-day notifi-
cation of hearing to family members, custodians and the proposed committee or guardian.
[Vol. 26:325
1992] GUARDIANSHIP LAWS
clearly distinguishable.103 The attorney, who zealously advocates
for the client's desires, regardless of the attorney's perception of
the client's best interests, may need to seek the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the client, if the attorney believes that the
client is severely impaired and cannot make the important deci-
sions about his or her own legal representation. 04 The guardian ad
litem, on the other hand, chooses a course of action on the pro-
posed ward's behalf and makes the decision for the client, based on
the client's "best interests" rather than what the particular indi-
vidual may desire under the circumstances. The Symposium rec-
ommends that the respondent's attorney should never act as
guardian ad litem.10 5
As the Symposium emphasized, "[a] mandatory right to counsel
recognizes the serious rights at stake in the proceeding.' 06 The re-
spondent, as well as the petitioner, must be represented at the
hearing to ensure that all significant points of view are given due
regard.07 Even if the issue of capacity appears clear, the adver-
sarial approach provides a mechanism for resolving other impor-
103. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 12 (Recommendation II-C).
104. Id. Florida's statute specifically provides that court appointed counsel for the pro-
posed ward represent his or her expressed wishes, rather than act as a guardian ad litem
who determines the best interests of the person. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331(2) (West Supp.
1991).
105. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 12. The Symposium recommendation requires:
counsel, along with a full hearing, in all guardianship cases... .Due to a concern
that the cost of counsel might place an undue burden on the ward's estate. . . coun-
sel should be appointed regardless of the respondent's ability to pay. ... [S]ince the
state, or a petitioner acting through the state, usually decides to intrude upon the
respondent's constitutionally protected rights, it would be unfair to require respon-
dents to hire their own lawyers.
Id. at 11.
The fundamental fairness argument for appointed counsel is supported by the court in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (reasoning that a cost requirement, valid on
its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party's mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard). It is notable that the American Bar Association has not
taken a position on this particular Symposium recommendation. Commission on Legal
Problems of the Elderly, ABA, STATE GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION: DIRECTIONS OF REFORM 4
(1989).
106. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 11.
107. Some commentators argue that a constitutional right to an appointed attorney exists
based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., SHERMAN, supra
note 69, at 362 (arguing that because of the imbalance of experience and expertise between
the parties to a guardianship proceeding where a healthy petitioner faces a disabled person,
the mandatory right to counsel that is available in other proceedings where serious liberty
loss is at stake also exists). The fact that the state does not have an attorney involved in the
proceeding seems to frame an open question on the contention.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tant matters, such as the identity of the guardian or the standards
to be used in making decisions. 108
The Virginia statutes conform to the Symposium recommenda-
tion with respect to hearing rights, except for the right to confront
and cross examine witnesses. Presumably, Virginia statutes contain
no bar to cross examination; e09 however, the statutory language is
ambiguous on that point. The Symposium report emphasizes that
the rights at issue for the proposed ward carry just as much weight
as those of an individual facing civil commitment. Thus, a compe-
tency hearing uses more stringent due process safeguards than
those used in a typical civil case, while falling short of the require-
ments in a criminal case."10
1. Defining Incapacity
The Symposium's thirty-three recommendations included within
their scope a number of substantive due process issues.
Addressing the controversy over the criteria used by courts to
determine incapacity, the Symposium proposed a definition of
incapacity:
Elements of Definition - The definition of incapacity should focus
upon but not be exclusively limited to the following elements: (a)
incapacity may be partial or complete; (b) incapacity is a legal, not a
medical, term; (c) a finding of incapacity should be supported by
evidence of functional impairment over time; (d) the finding of inca-
pacity should include a determination that the person is likely to
suffer substantial harm by reason of an inability to provide adequate
personal care or management of property or financial affairs; and (e)
108. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 11.
109. See Schmidt v. Goddin 224 Va. 474, 297 S.E.2d 701 (1982) (at a hearing to restore
competency and discharge, committee court allowed a narrow exception of "good cause" for
not permitting presentation of witnesses, confrontation, or cross-examination where attor-
ney for patient was present throughout but the patient was excluded from the hearing dur-
ing testimony of one of the doctors); Wolfrey v. Swank, 184 Va. 922, 37 S.E.2d 17 (1946)
(report of an ex parte examination by medical officers of Veteran's Administration was in-
admissable as evidence of incompetency where patient had no opportunity to cross-examine
the officers).
110. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 12; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
424 (1979) (case involving involuntary commitment of person to state mental hospital, hold-
ing that "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof is applicable where impor-
tant individual rights are at stake, whether civil or criminal).
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age, eccentricity, poverty or medical diagnosis alone should not be
sufficient to justify a finding of incapacity.""'
The Symposium also recommended that the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws redefine the term
"incapacity" presently contained in section 1-201(7) of Chapter V
of the Uniform Probate Code."2 As it stands now, the UPC defini-
tion does not measure the individual's ability to function in soci-
ety, and the standard judging an individual according to whether
he makes "responsible" decisions is overly vague. 113
While the two Virginia statutes that authorize appointment of a
guardian, sections 37.1-128.1 and 37.1-132 of the Code, 4 are
worded slightly differently, each establishes basically the same set
of criteria for a finding of incapacity. Section 37.1-128.1 applies to
a person who "by reason of mental illness or mental retardation
has become incapable, either wholly or partially, of taking care of
himself or his estate." 5 Section 37.1-132 applies to a person who
"by reason of impaired health or physical disability, has become
mentally or physically incapable of taking care of himself or his
estate."116 Under these statutes, therefore, there must be an under-
lying medical diagnosis to account for the incapacity, in addition to
a showing of functional disability.117 This standard most closely
comports with the "causal link" definition put forth by the Con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment report discussed ear-
lier.'"8 The weakness in the causal link approach, as pointed out by
Professor Regan, is that a finding of incapacity may be based on
nothing more than a "conclusory opinion that in the physician's
judgment the person is unable to manage his affairs."" 19
The Symposium cautioned that: (1) the legal term "incapacity"
should not be measured according to a medical diagnosis alone, but
111. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 15 (Recommendation III-A).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-128.1, -132 (Michie 1990).
115. Id. § 37.1-128.1.
116. Id. § 37.1-132.
117. Judge Clifford R. Weckstein stated that a "petition for appointment of guardian
must include medical documentation of diagnosis, including the extent, duration and nature
of the disability." Judge Clifford R. Weckstein, Address to the Virginia Public Forum, Roa-
noke, Va. (Sept. 12, 1989).
118. LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 3, at 171; see also supra text accompanying
notes 52-55.
119. Regan, supra note 10.
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that the diagnosis should be related to a legal standard or to the
respondent's ability to function; (2) because "incapacities often
change, a finding of incapacity should be supported by evidence of
functional impairment over time;" and (3) viewing incapacity at
only one or two points in time can result in a misleading
conclusion. 120
Because the Virginia statutes require the court to include the
"nature and extent of the person's incapacity" as well as the defi-
nition of the powers and duties of the guardian, apparently the
court will consider the functional abilities of the proposed ward. 2 '
Virginia statutes do not require that the court consider the
changes in the person's functional ability over time, or that there
be a showing that the person is likely to suffer "substantial harm
by reason of inability," as recommended by the Symposium. 22 The
Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardianship recommends
that the courts, in conjunction with physical and mental health
care professionals, develop a standardized assessment to use for
determining incapacity.1 23 Hopefully, once this is done, a further
refinement of the definition will be forthcoming.
2. Restoration of Capacity
The Symposium addressed the standards for restoration of legal
capacity in its recommendation that "court[s] should respond
promptly to a ward's request for a redetermination of status."' 24
The Symposium also recommended imposing the burden of proof
on those seeking to continue the guardianship. 125 Generally, the
law presumes that when a person is found to be legally incapaci-
tated, he remains in that condition. In order for a ward to regain
his competent status, he generally must initiate a separate judicial
proceeding to prove his capacity. 2 '
120. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 15.
121. Sections 37.1-128.1 and -132 of the Code require the court order to define the powers
and duties of the guardian "to permit the incapacitated person to care for himself and man-
age his property to the extent that he is capable." VA CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-128.1(a)(ii), -132
(Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
122. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 15 (Recommendation III-A).
123. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 6.
124. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 18 (Recommendation III-F).
125. Id.
126. PARRY, supra note 5, at 392.
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The 1989 amendment to section 37.1-134.3 of the Code, which
allows reinstatement of any matter resulting in a determination of
incapacity, 121 was a legislative attempt to facilitate access to the
courts for persons seeking reconsideration of their status. Never-
theless, the statute allowing for restoration of legal capacity, sec-
tion 37.1-134.1, places the burden on the ward to "present evidence
that the person has substantially, regained his ability to care for his
person and manage and handle his estate. 1
28
The experience of Marguerite Van Etten, as discussed in the
AARP News Bulletin, graphically illustrates the difficulties faced
by a person seeking restoration of competency. 121 Marguerite, who
described herself as a thoroughly competent person, president of
two organizations and vice-president of another, was seriously in-
jured in an automobile accident in 1983. While she was in a coma,
her daughter successfully petitioned a local court to appoint her as
Marguerite's guardian. When Marguerite regained her health a few
months later, she discovered a harsh reality:
As a ward, she could not own a house, marry or divorce, vote, drive a
car - nor could she manage her own money.
It took only a few minutes for a judge to put her under a guardi-
anship,. . . but a great deal of persistence - and thousands of dol-
lars - to end it.
[Lawyers] told her she needed statements vouching for her com-
petency from the psychiatrist, doctor and minister who had signed
the original guardianship petition.
Once the statements were in hand, [she] pushed for a court hear-
ing to argue her competency .... [N]early one year after her acci-
dent, she was once again declared competent.130
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.3 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
128. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that §37.1-134.1 of the Code does not re-
quire the additional findings enunciated in the statutes addressing the initial adjudication of
legal incapacity. Schmidt v. Goddin, 224 Va. 474, 297 S.E.2d 701 (1982) (children of long-
term patient in sanitorium who unsuccessfully sought restoration of capacity appealed the
decision arguing that the trial court was required to make additional findings).
129. Barbara Coleman, Dubious Protection, 29 AARP NEws BULLETIN 2 (1988).
130. Id.
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3. Least Restrictive Alternatives
The Symposium raises another substantive issue regarding the
use of limited guardianship and other less restrictive alternatives.
The chapter of the Symposium report addressing judicial practices
includes the following recommendation:
Use of Limited Guardianship - In the absence of statute, judges
should use their inherent or equity powers to limit the scope of and
tailor the guardianship order to the particular needs of the ward.
The petition and order should include detailed statements of the
respondent's functional capabilities and limitations. If practical, the
court order should require the guardian to attempt to maximize self-
reliance, autonomy and independence. Finally, the guardian periodi-
cally should report these efforts to the court. 1'
The Symposium further emphasized the importance of including
"the least restrictive alternative doctrine" and practical ways to
tailor guardianship in continuing legal education for judges and
court personnel..3
2
An inherent and recurring conflict in guardianship law arises
from the tension between the civil liberties of the ward and the
state's parens patriae power. Legal scholars contend that the con-
stitutional doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative" should ap-
ply in guardianship cases, limiting state paternalism to action nec-
essary for the health and welfare of the individual.'
The Supreme Court established the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" doctrine in 1960 when it stated:
Even though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same purpose.134
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit first applied the doctrine to the area of civil commitment in
131. ABA CoMMIssION, supra note 21, at 19 (Recommendation IV-B).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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Lake v. Cameron135 when it found that an elderly woman could not
be committed to an institution indefinitely without an exhaustive
exploration of all possible alternatives for her care and treatment
in the community. Numerous courts have followed the Lake hold-
ing that the least restrictive alternative doctrine applies to com-
mitment cases.136 Furthermore, applicable law in Virginia includes
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Thomas S. v. Mor-
row. 137 In Thomas S., the court found that a young man whose
liberty had been restrained by the appointment of a guardian and
inappropriate placement in a hospital and a detoxification facility
was entitled to the treatment recommended by a team of profes-
sionals which offered the possibility of alternatives less restrictive
to his fundamental freedom.13
The Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardianship ex-
pressed a favorable opinion over the application of the least re-
strictive alternative doctrine in Virginia guardianship proceedings.
According to the Subcommittee, "the principle of 'least restrictive
alternative' as found in case law should be formalized to the extent
that the court order covers all points including exhaustion of all
other alternatives prior to the appointment of a guardian.' 1 39
Various legal alternatives short of guardianship do exist in Vir-
ginia. If an individual receives education and advice prior to be-
coming incapacitated, he or she can execute a durable power of
attorney, a health care power of attorney, a "living will" or an inter
vivos (living) trust. Also, a direct deposit or joint bank account and
assignment of a representative payee provide effective alternative
mechanisms for persons who are not capable of managing their
finances.
A power of attorney is perhaps the least restrictive alternative
because the individual exercises complete control over the selection
of the person who will "stand in his or her shoes" to make deci-
sions in the event of incapacity. 40 Virginia law allows for "dura-
ble" powers, which survive incapacity, and for "springing" (or con-
135. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
136. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 20.
137. 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124, and cert. denied 479 U.S. 869
(1986).
138. Id. at 376.
139. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27 , at 6.
140. A power of attorney is the written expression of an agency agreement and the law of
agency is generally applicable. VIGNERY, supra note 26, at 3.
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tingent) powers, which do not become effective until a specified
time or event has occurred (such as when disability develops)."'" In
addition, Virginia also recognizes a special power of attorney spe-
cifically authorizing another person to make decisions regarding all
health care matters.14 2 To insure that the individual obtains a deci-
sionmaker or agent of his own choosing, both a secondary and pri-
mary agent may be named. In the event that the primary agent is
unable or unwilling to continue, the secondary agent takes over.
The "power" may be written with specific information about the
person's choices, including wishes concerning medical treatment in
the event of a non-terminal illness rendering the person unable to
communicate or make decisions about his or her care. The individ-
ual also may specify the kind of medical treatment he or she con-
siders to be "heroic" or "extraordinary," and whether he or she
considers artificial nutrition "medical treatment" or "comfort and
care."' 4 A carefully written power of attorney can protect the indi-
vidual's right to self-determination, and comply with his or her
best interests, without a need for court intervention.
The Virginia Natural Death Act' although not intended to be
alternative to guardianship, nevertheless provides a method of al-
lowing a surrogate decisionmaker to act when an individual person
may no longer be capable of making personal decisions. However,
Virginia's "living will" act' 45 applies only in cases where the indi-
141. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11.9-1 to 4 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1989).
142. Id.
143. M. Garey Eakes, An Introduction to the Elder Law Practice, VA. LAw., Nov. 1989, at
27. The 1991 Session of the General Assembly amended the Virginia Natural Death Act to
clarify that artificially supplied food and hydration are considered life-prolonging proce-
dures under the Act, making it even more important that an individual whose own personal
values dictate that the administration of food and hydration does not constitute an artificial
life prolonging procedure specify his or her exact wishes in that regard. VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2982 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1991). Justice Brennan addressed this type of conflicting values
in his dissenting opinion in the Cruzan case:
In few areas of health care are people's evaluation of their experiences so varied
and uniquely personal as in their assessments of the nature and value of the processes
associated with dying. For some, every moment of life is of inestimable value; for
others, life without some desired level of mental or physical ability is worthless or
burdensome. A moderate degree of suffering may be an important means of personal
growth and religious experiences to one person, but only frightening or despicable to
another.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2878 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing, quoting from the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
144. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1991).
145. Id. § 54.1-2982.
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vidual suffers from a "terminal illness. Furthermore, the physician
or any other person is not legally compelled to honor the "living
will. ' 146 Nevertheless, a "living will" written by a subsequently in-
capacitated person may avoid the necessity of court intervention to
authorize the termination of life-sustaining treatment in accor-
dance with the prior stated wishes of the patient. Again, the right
to self-determination regarding medical treatment is preserved.
Other alternatives to guardianship include court interventions
involving a single decision. For example, a recently enacted Vir-
ginia statute allows for judicial authorization of treatment. 147 An-
other alternative is embodied in the companion legislation author-
izing non-judicial substitute decisionmaking for non-protesting
patients, allowing the family to make a decision without resorting
to appointment of a guardian. 48
A final less restrictive alternative is the appointment of a limited
guardian rather than a plenary guardian. As noted in the New
York study, courts seem to resist the effort of tailoring the guardi-
anship to fit the particular needs of the individual ward. 14 9 In a
"limited guardianship," the guardian is assigned only those duties
146. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 12. But see Gail McKnight,
Bill Would Force Honoring of Right To Die, THE TENNESSEAN, April 19, 1991, at B1, Col. 1.
(reporting on proposal before Tennessee legislature that would force treating physicians to
honor "living wills" in cases where the patient's condition meets statutory criteria, including
a coma or persistent vegetative state).
147. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.5 (Michie, Repl. Vol. 1990). Contrasting the recent
amendment to Maryland guardianship law with Virginia's alternative, in 1990 the Maryland
legislature expanded the guardianship duties and powers which a court may order to include
the power to withhold or withdraw medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or
service, unless it would involve substantial risk to the life of a disabled person, in which case
it is necessary to seek court authorization. MD. EST. & TausTs CODE ANN. §§13-708(b)(8)-(c)
(Michie Supp. 1991). The Virginia statute for judicial authorization of specific medical
treatment, including the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, specifically excludes from
those it is intended to serve persons for whom a guardian or committee has been appointed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.5(G)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
148. Id. § 37.1-134.4. Family members are the most common surrogate decisionmakers.
The President's Commission endorsed decisionmaking by the family in consultation with
the physician and other health care professionals. In addition a Virginia Appellate Court
case, Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. App. 414 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) recog-
nizes the right of family members to make decisions.
Professor Regan emphasizes that patients need the protection of (a) a formal procedure,
preferably involving a second physician's opinion that the patient meets the criteria of inca-
pacity and that the illness is terminal with no prognosis for recovery, and (b) valid notice to
the patient that a decision is being made regarding his/her capacity, and that a surrogate
decisionmaker is being appointed who will make a decision regarding his/her treatment. See
Regan, supra note 10.
149. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 21.
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and powers that the individual is incapable of exercising. The Vir-
ginia statutes specify that the guardianship order shall "define the
powers and duties of the guardian so as to permit the incapaci-
tated person to care for himself and manage his property to the
extent that he is capable" and "specify whether the determination
of incapacity is perpetual or limited to a specific length of time."15
In other words, the law in Virginia favors limited guardianship.
Obviously, there is room for judicial discretion, and in Virginia, as
elsewhere, the tendency of courts to appoint plenary guardians is a
concern. 151 Certainly, the words of the statute imply a presumption
that a limited guardianship is all that is available in Virginia, be-
cause the statute requires that "[c]lear and convincing evidence
shall be presented in the hearing to support each provision in the
court's order of appointment."' 152 Shifting the presumption away
from a plenary appointment to a limited appointment increases
the likelihood that courts will use only the degree of guardianship
power clearly warranted by the ward's specific incapacity.'53
4. Conflict of Interest
A number of recommendations in the Symposium's report ad-
dress potential conflicts of interest between guardians and wards.
The recommendations also emphasize the need for closer judicial
supervision of guardians, requiring accountability of the guardians
of the person as well as guardians of the property.15 4 Virginia, how-
ever, requires no monitoring of non-financial decisions made by
guardians. 5 5 Although the Virginia Joint Subcommittee recom-
mended development of a standardized accounting form to be used
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-128.1 and 134 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
151. Judges Weckstein and Trabue have publicly affirmed their commitment to the statu-
tory preference for appointment of limited guardianship. Weckstein, supra note 117 and
Trabue, supra note 75. But see ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 21 (a 1985 study con-
cluded that "generally, the most, rather than the least restrictive protective arrangement is
employed").
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-128.1 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
153. Regan, supra note 10. Limited guardianships are statutorily required in the states of
Utah and Michigan. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-304(2)(1978); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
700.444(2) (West Supp. 1991). Both laws require the court to make a specific finding that
nothing less than a full guardianship is adequate, if it does not grant a limited guardianship.
154. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 23-27 (Recommendations V-A through F).
Guardianship orders may specify a guardian's power over property or may be limited to the
person. Traditionally, some accounting of the ward's property is required, but in the case of
guardians of the person, there is often no mechanism that allows or encourages any review
of the guardian's performance in respect to the ward. Id. at 24.
155. PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 30.
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by local Commissioners of Accounts to more closely scrutinize the
activities of guardians, no legislative action has been taken to in-
sure closer supervision of guardians.
VII. A PUBLIc GUARDIANSHIP PROGRAM FOR VIRGINIA
Another aspect of guardianship addressed by the reform move-
ment is the plight of persons, usually elderly nursing home pa-
tients or persons in state mental institutions, who have no family
or friends to serve as a guardian when the need arises. In order to
preserve self-determination and personal autonomy for these per-
sons, some system must be devised where the government or a pri-
vate individual provides guardianship services. But nowhere is the
tension between the state acting in its parens patriae capacity and
the efforts of civil libertarians to preserve self-determination more
pronounced than when discussion turns to a system of public
guardianship. Professor Regan aptly identifies two aspects of the
controversy when he contrasts the image of a "super state welfare
official" who takes charge of a particular class of persons (such as
the poor) against the present system which, in the absence of a
public guardian, allows for exploitation, particularly of the elderly
and the disabled.15
In 1981, the Administration of the Agency on Aging funded the
publication of a study of public guardianship programs in the
United States. 5 ' At that time, thirty-four states had enacted some
statutory provision for public guardianship services. 15s The guardi-
anship services across the states could be classified into four differ-
ent models: the court model, the independent state office model,
the social service agency model, and the county model. Also, the
research noted that states without public guardianship laws em-
ployed a number of methods to deal with persons needing guardi-
ans: benign neglect, de facto guardians, assignment of a relative or
friend, commitment to a mental hospital, private attorneys, banks,
nonprofit organizations (usually with a religious affiliation), county
156. Regan, supra note 10; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 9 (discussing Nicholas
Krittrie's description of a "new hybrid system of social control" known as the therapeutic
state).
157. SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 167. A public guardian is an agent of the government who
serves when (1) there are no family members or friends willing to take responsibility of
guardianship and (2) where the money in the estate is insufficient to attract attorneys,
banks, or similar entities.
158. Id. at 8.
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level social service programs utilizing volunteers, and citizen
groups serving as a guardian bank.15
Though public guardians generally operate under the same laws
as other guardians, 160 it is clear that the potential wards of a public
guardianship program are likely to be even more vulnerable than
other members of the least visible minority. Public wards lack fam-
ily or friends to help protect their interests, therefore, the laws
should provide them with even more stringent due process
protections.
A primary concern of critics of public guardianship programs is
the issue of a conflict of interest between the public guardian and
the ward. 1" When the guardianship agencies function as both
guardian and direct service provider, there is an inherent conflict,
primarily because the public guardian's role is to challenge service
provider agencies that are not providing proper services. Of partic-
ular concern are the programs in which the public guardian is an
appointed official from within a pre-existing social service agency.
Commentators refer to this type of program as a conflict of interest
model." 2
In response to these concerns, the Symposium recommended the
appointment of independent public guardians, to insure that they
were free to objectively evaluate and advocate for their wards'
needs, and if necessary, challenge inadequate or inappropriate ser-
vices. '6 Using a nonprofit, nongovernmental, independent agency
as public guardian allows the guardian to avoid undue influence by
other state interests, such as protecting society,, reducing expendi-
tures, or serving as a case manager. 4
The Virginia General Assembly began to study the need for a
public guardianship program in response to a serious shortage of
people willing to serve as guardians. 6 5 Another serious problem is
159. Id. at 149.
160. PARRY, supra note 5, at 390.
161. Id. See e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 60; ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 29-
30.
162. SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 60; see also ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 30.
163. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 30 (Recommendation IV-A).
164. PARRY, supra note 5, at 390.
165. For example, directors of social services agencies and advocates for the elderly re-
ported situations where elderly persons waited as long as eleven months for appointment of
a guardian when there were no family members in a position to serve as guardians. This was
the case for an eighty-year-old Chesterfield woman whose health had deteriorated to the
point that she needed more care than could be provided by the social workers coming to her
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that many Virginia nursing homes will not accept even Medicaid-
eligible patients unless they are signed in by a responsible person.
This usually means that the responsible person must submit a
statement of financial responsibility, which frightens relatives.
1 66
Apparently, even relatives often do not want to bear the responsi-
bilities or kinds of decisions they would have to make as
guardians.1 6 7
The urgent need for a public response to the shortage of availa-
ble guardians, coupled with the unsatisfactory statutory provision
of the local sheriff as the guardian of last resort, led the General
Assembly in 1988 to direct the Department of Social Services to
examine the concept of reserving public guardianship as a service
of last resort. The results of that examination and proposals for an
appropriate legislative response were presented to the Governor
and the General Assembly in January, 1990.168
The proposal to the legislators included five design options, or
models, that could be established to provide the needed public
guardianship services in Virginia. One particular model was recom-
mended for adoption to serve as a pilot project, in order to begin
the data collection that would be required for long-range planning.
The Virginia public guardianship program targets a population de-
scribed as the most vulnerable "incapacitated adult recipients of
Adult Protective Services.""" To be eligible for Adult Protective
Services, the statute requires a finding of abuse, neglect or ex-
ploitation. 170 The proposal included the following components
deemed necessary to safeguard the rights of persons who would be-
come wards of the public guardian:
Emphasis on Alternatives [to guardianship] ...
home and her only brother was also elderly and unable to act in the role of guardian. ROA-
NOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 21, 1989, at B3.
166. A decision to admit an incompetent person to a nursing home is a health care deci-
sion. The practice of requiring the "signature of a 'responsible party' in addition to or in lieu
of the signature of the [patient]. . .may very well violate federal and state laws governing
Medicaid-funded facilities and/or deceptive trade practices." VIGNERY, supra note 26, at
121.
167. ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, supra note 165, at B3.
168. See PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS, supra note 1, at i.
169. Id. at 11. This target population is consistent with other states that have enacted
public guardianship programs. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-28-17-21 (West Repl. Vol. 1990).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.4 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1987).
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Eligibility Criteria Based on Need - and without regard to age,
cause of disability, community based or institutional living arrange-
ment or income;
Multi-Disciplinary Assessment/Reassessment Process . ..
Defined Roles of Human Service Agencies - utilize available ser-
vices and collective expertise in serving . . [the wards] . . .;
Use of Volunteers - to provide alternative services . . . [and] to
enhance the quality of the public guardianship system;
Due Process Protections ...
Ongoing Case Monitoring - to assess the performance of the guard-
ian and the well-being of the ward;
Minimum Standards of Performance [for the guardian] . . .
Public Education and Professional Development. . . [and;]
Advisory Board - to function as a planning, coordinating and prob-
lem-solving focus for the public guardianship program."'
The five design options presented the legislators originated in
designs used in other states, including 1) a public guardianship
program administered by the Department of Social Services; 2)
state initiated contracts for public guardianship services; 3) a free-
standing public guardianship agency; 4) a volunteer guardianship
program; and 5) a guardianship program administered by the
court.172 Each structure would require the General Assembly to es-
tablish a legal base, provide authority for promulgation of regula-
tions and implementation of the design, and to allocate funds for
the program. The department considered the advantages and dis-
advantages of each model. The proposal recommended that the
Department of Social Services implement a pilot project in one of
its seven regions using the local departments of social services to
provide casework, with public guardianship provided at the re-
gional office level."13 The pilot project would operate for two years
and serve approximately eighty Adult Protective Services clients at
171. PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 12.
172. Id. at 13.
173. Id. at 16.
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any one time. Primarily the pilot project would gauge the effective-
ness of the public program and estimate the number of persons
who would benefit, as well as the annual cost of providing the
service. 174
The Department of Social Services model would employ a state-
level guardianship administrator with overall administrative/super-
visory/monitoring responsibilities, and two regional public guardi-
ans to provide guardianship services to the wards. Referrals would
come through local Adult Protective Services programs. Local so-
cial services departments would maintain open files on all adults
served by the regional public guardian and would retain responsi-
bility for ongoing case management.175
This recommended design falls prey to criticism as a classic ex-
ample of the "conflict of interest" model of provision of public
guardianship services.1 6 Problems include the difficulty of distin-
guishing between the role of the public guardian and that of a gen-
eral protective services agent, and the conflict created when the
public guardian is employed by an agency whose main purpose is
the efficient distribution of financial and social assistance. How-
ever, this model carries the advantage of building on the delivery
system already in place to serve the target population. It also pro-
motes a multi-disciplinary approach to assessment which the pro-
ponents anticipate would minimize the potential conflict of inter-
est, using the expertise of Area Agencies on Aging, Community
Service Boards, and other local agencies serving specialized popu-
lations. 71 As a two year pilot project, the program would be sub-
ject to adaptation and restructuring based on results of evaluation
and data collection.
Because of difficulties inherent in situations requiring appoint-
ment of a public guardian, many commentators worry that public
guardian programs will only extend the abuses which occur in pri-
vate guardianships. 78 Nonetheless, most people writing on the
subject, as well as those who work in the field, favor the establish-
ment of public guardianships, despite their drawbacks. 179
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id. at 19.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
177. PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 14.
178. SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 15.
179. Id. at 15, 76.
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However, some commentators adamantly oppose guardianship in
any form. One writer states that: "In a society which venerates lib-
erty, conservatorship is an anachronism. Neither the interest of po-
tential beneficiaries nor the interest of the state in having a better
management position vis-a-vis the ward is justified.' ' Is0
Questioning the assumption that social interventions benefit the
individuals involved, critics see potential harm in guardianship be-
cause it is often applied for inappropriate reasons according to in-
valid standards.'" One writer even refers to the appointment of a
guardian as "an initiation rite for the entry of the poor and inept
into the managed society."' '82
This "abolitionist" position, as it is referred to in the literature,
is premised on the notion that there is no such condition as mental
incompetency, there is only behavior that deviates from society's
norms for acceptable conduct.'8 3 The abolitionist would allow the
law to punish only behavior actually, objectively, and physically
harmful to society. However, the abolitionists do not address ways
in which society should deal with the extreme cases of self-neglect
that often lead to the appointment of a guardian.8 4 Since it lacks
an affirmative policy to address the vacuum that would exist with-
out guardianship, the abolitionist position makes only a minimal
contribution to the reform movement.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR REFORM IN VIRGINIA
The Bill of Rights does not distinguish between competent and
incompetent persons.8 5 Entitlement to due process rights before
the deprivation of life, liberty or property applies equally to per-
sons when they are conscious or unconscious, competent or
incompetent.
180. Regan, supra note 7, at 1128 (quoting George J. Alexander, Who Benefits from Con-
servatorship?, TRIAL, May 1977, at 32).
181. For example, a board and care provider may require a guardian's signature to au-
thorize the use of restrictions to ensure that residents (former mental hospital patients) do
not leave the facility, and if there is no guardian, the resident cannot remain at the facility.
Mitchell, supra note 47, at 462; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 127.
182. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 466.
183. Regan, supra note 7, at 1128-29.
184. Id. at 1129.




The state acting under its parens patriae or its police powers
cannot restrict fundamental freedoms of either competent or in-
competent persons except by the least restrictive alternative means
available. When any persons's mental capacity to make personal
decisions is in question, that person is entitled to the protection of
his or her constitutional rights.
Virginia lawmakers made significant strides in recent years to
better ensure that all citizens have full protection of the laws
whenever they need a substitute decisionmaker. Still, much needs
to be done to see that judges incorporate the policy changes es-
poused by the Joint Subcommittee Studying Legal Guardianship.
Medical caregivers and social service providers need to implement
alternatives to guardianship in place of reliance on a court ap-
pointed guardian as its sole option to substitute decisionmaking.
The duties of guardians ad litem should be clearly identified ei-
ther legislatively, or by judicial decree, to assure that an appointed
guardian ad litem fulfills a specified role in the guardianship pro-
ceeding. The guardian ad litem's duties should include provision of
a follow-up report detailing for the court the guardian's plan for
treatment of the ward and an update on the ward's status at a
particular point in time (perhaps, six months) after the guardian's
appointment. Moreover, funding should be allocated by the legisla-
ture to provide for the increased expectations of the court ap-
pointed guardian ad litem.
The urgent need to develop a system that protects the rights of
self-determination and personal autonomy of incapacitated per-
sons with no friends or family mandates the necessity of additional
funds and authorization for the establishment of a public guardi-
anship program. The Public Guardianship Program ("the Pro-
gram") should be established as an independent state agency,
funded separately under the Secretary of Health and Human Re-
sources. Only by creating a separate free-standing agency to pro-
vide the public guardianship services can the legislators appropri-
ately address the critical need of this group of constituents who are
acutely vulnerable to abuse and neglect.
The Program must maintain a separate identity in order to pre-
serve its ability to act on behalf of the clients, persons without
friend or family to serve as guardians. Otherwise, the conflict of
interest inherent in a system where the Program is attached to a
pre-existing state agency, such as the Department of Social Ser-
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vices or the Department for the Aging, becomes an issue of great
concern. These other agencies bear direct responsibilities to pro-
vide services to the persons who will be wards of the public guard-
ian. The public guardian will have a duty to challenge the provi-
sion of services by state and federal agencies when the situation
requires such a challenge. A public guardian, who is also a member
of the staff of the state agency, stands in a position too compro-
mised to adequately protect the client's interests. 86
The Program, as an independent agency, can be structured after
the Virginia Department for the Rights of Virgihians with Disabili-
ties (DRVD). The DRVD advocates on behalf of disabled persons
in Virginia, providing legal assistance to secure services to which
the clients are entitled by law. The Governor appoints a director,
and the department is assigned to the Secretary of Health and
Human Resources. The department operates apart from all other
agencies. The effectiveness of the DRVD depends on the agency's
independence and distinction from other service-providing agen-
cies, because the DRVD must advocate on behalf of its clients for
improved services from one of the other state agencies.'87
The Program would serve many of the same clients that are
served by the Departments of Health, Social Services, Rehabilita-
tion, Visually Handicapped, and Aging. The Program should be di-
rected by a multi-disciplinary Board, and its charge should include
a mandate requiring inter-agency planning and service provision
by signed agreements. In communities where the services needed
by the ward are available from private agencies, the Program
should develop cooperative agreements between the public sector
and the private agencies to provide the services that would benefit
the ward. This method contains the costs of operating the Program
and minimizes the expansion of state government bureaucracy.
The Program structure should allow for a'de-centralization of staff;
there should be a state-level program administrator and at least
one public guardian for each Health Department region through-
out the Commonwealth (until the data collection process provides
the statistics revealing how staff could be better allocated).
Referrals to the regional public guardian could be made by
Adult Protective Services staff, the Mental Health agencies, case
managers for elderly and disabled persons, local Departments of
186. STATEMENT, supra note 101, at 5.
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-36 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1990).
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Social Services, Health Department personnel, and others. The
public guardian would be appointed by the circuit courts to serve
the ward through the statutory guardianship process and should be
accountable to the court for the ward's treatment.
The primary objections to the independent agency model for the
Public Guardianship Program are the cost and the unnecessary ex-
pansion of state government. Although there will be an incremen-
tal expansion of state government, such expansion may not be un-
necessary. Appending the program to a pre-existing department
endangers the individual rights of the wards because the program
cannot function with sufficient independence to properly serve the
wards' needs. Moreover, an independent agency may not even be
more costly than a program that operates as a part of a pre-ex-
isting department, because each requires the same number of pub-
lic guardians. Hiding the cost figures in the budget of another de-
partment does not necessarily insure a less expensive program.
Overall, the critical need for the Program compels a legislative de-
cision emphasizing justice and compassion over the minimal varia-
tions in cost between the independent model and the conflict of
interest model.
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